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Abstract 
In this paper, we quantify the effect of the so-called “quantitative monetary easing” which the Bank of 
Japan adopted in March 2001. Now that short-term interest rates are almost zero and monetary base 
growth is over 20% year on year, active debate continues with respect to the effectiveness of 
monetary policy at zero interest rates. Taking into account the regime change in monetary policy and 
the possible non-linearity of money demand at low (or near zero) interest rates, we use a Bayesian 
vector autoregression (VAR), a VAR with time-varying coefficients, to extract the effect of the increase 
in the monetary base at zero interest rates. The result of a Bayesian VAR indicates that while an 
increase in the monetary base previously had a positive impact on prices, it does not now at zero 
interest rates. In order to investigate the possible reason for this result, we then estimate a money 
demand function, and test whether a satiation level in demand for the monetary base exists at zero 
interest rates. The key finding here is that the null hypothesis of the non-existence of the satiation level 
can be statistically rejected. This means that there may remain room for an increase in the monetary 
base to stimulate the economy at zero interest rates. Despite the existence of the satiation level of 
money demand, why does the Bayesian VAR result suggest that an increase in the monetary base 
does not have a positive impact on economic activity at zero interest rates? One consistent 
interpretation of these two results is that the effect, if any, of the increase in the monetary base is 
highly uncertain and very small. We confirm this view by estimating models that include both 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply functions and testing whether the monetary base enters 
these equations significantly. Finally, we discuss reasons why the expansion of the monetary base at 
zero interest rates has such a limited and uncertain effect on the economy. 
1. Introduction 
On 19 March 2001, the Bank of Japan introduced new procedures for money market operations under 
which the outstanding balance of current accounts held at the Bank, instead of the overnight call rate, 
is used as the main operating target. The change in the operating target was closely related to the fact 
that the overnight call rate had almost reached a zero bound and the Bank still needed to ease 
monetary policy to combat persistent deflationary pressure. The target level of the outstanding balance 
of current accounts held at the Bank exceeded the actual amount of February 2001. At the same time, 
the Bank decided that the new procedures for money market operations should remain in place until 
the consumer price index (CPI) (excluding perishables; nationwide) registered stably at zero per cent 
or an increase year on year. The Bank also decided to increase the outright purchase of long-term 
government bonds if it considered this necessary to smoothly provide liquidity. Furthermore, the Bank 
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established a so-called “lombard-type” lending facility that enables financial institutions, under certain 
conditions, to borrow funds from the Bank at the official discount rate as long as they have eligible 
collateral. This entire policy regime is often referred to as “quantitative monetary easing” measures. 
The new policy regime was introduced to explore the possibility of further monetary easing even after 
short-term interest rates had fallen to zero. The Bank of Japan pursued this policy, while concurrently 
examining the following effects theoretically assumed on Japan’s economy. 
First, lower interest rates would still have a stimulative impact on the economy. In this regard, the 
announcement that the new policy regime should be maintained until CPI inflation becomes zero or 
more was intended to induce maximum effects from a rather limited call rate cut on longer-term rates. 
Second, the abundant provision of liquidity would make money market participants feel more secure 
about the availability of funds, thereby preserving financial market stability. Third, an increase in 
reserves might invite liquidity satiation and, consequently, somehow induce portfolio shifts in financial 
assets, resulting in, for example, a rise in stock prices, depreciation of the yen, or credit expansion. 
Fourth, decisive monetary policy messages supported by an increase in reserves might have some 
positive effects on expectations held by corporations and households with respect to the future course 
of the economy and prices. 
One and a half years have passed since the Bank introduced this new policy regime. Based on 
experiences and related data so far, we analyse the effects of “quantitative monetary easing” 
measures at zero interest rates and try to make a tentative evaluation. The rest of the paper proceeds 
as follows. We begin in Section 2 by surveying recent developments in monetary policy and the 
observed reactions of financial indicators. In Section 3 we survey the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy at zero interest rates from a theoretical viewpoint. In Section 4, taking into account the 
regime change in monetary policy and the possible non-linearity of money demand at low (or near 
zero) interest rates, we use a Bayesian VAR, a VAR with time-varying coefficients, to extract the 
effects of the increase in the monetary base. In Section 5, we investigate whether a satiation level of 
money demand exists at zero interest rates by estimating a money demand function. In Section 6, we 
then estimate models that include both aggregate demand and aggregate supply functions and 
examine whether the monetary base enters these equations significantly. In Section 7, we discuss 
reasons why the expansion of the monetary base at zero interest rates has a limited and uncertain 
effect on the economy. Section 8 presents concluding remarks. 
2.  Recent developments in monetary policy in Japan and the reaction of 
financial indicators 
The collapse of asset prices in the early 1990s was the beginning of a long economic slump in Japan, 
which is characterised as several deep cyclical downturns with some modest short-lived economic 
recovery. There is a consensus among policymakers and economists that one of the basic structural 
problems Japan’s economy has faced is the non-performing loan (henceforth NPL) problem of the 
banking sector. The impaired balance sheet of the banking sector has prevented the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy from working smoothly, thereby dampening the financial and economic 
responses to monetary policy easing. 
As early as 1995, the Bank of Japan had little room for further reducing interest rates. The Bank 
maintained the uncollateralised overnight call rate as low as around 0.5% despite the fact that Japan’s 
economy recovered at a more than 3% growth rate of GDP from 1995 to 1996. In autumn 1997, 
Japan’s economy started to deteriorate, largely under the influence of financial system disturbance 
reflecting the failure of large financial institutions. The Bank successively lowered the overnight call 
rate to 0.02% in February 1999. The period between 1999 and 2000 is often called the “zero interest 
rate” period. In August 2000, the Bank lifted its “zero interest rate” policy and raised the overnight call 
rate to 0.25%, since the economy was showing clear signs of continued recovery. However, in late 
2000, the economy started to deteriorate again, reflecting adjustment of global IT and related exports, 
and concern over deflation intensified. The Bank lowered the policy interest rate one last time to 
0.15% and then adopted quantitative monetary easing in March 2001. In sum, while the NPL problem 
of the banking sector has been a serious factor weakening the effects of accommodative monetary 
policy, the zero bound of interest rates has become an ever more intractable issue from the viewpoint 
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That was the background leading to the Bank of Japan’s decision to finally discard the orthodox 
operating framework and adopt a new framework under which it set the outstanding balance of current 
accounts at the Bank, instead of the uncollateralised overnight call rate, as the main operating target. 
When the Bank adopted this new regime, it raised the target level of the current account balance to 
around JPY 5 trillion (March 2001), about JPY 1 trillion larger than that immediately prevailing before 
the change (Graph 1). After that, it raised the target level to around JPY 6 trillion (August 2001), more 
than JPY 6 trillion (September), and JPY 10 to 15 trillion (December). Also, on 28 February 2002, to 
secure financial market stability towards the fiscal year-end, the Bank decided to provide more liquidity 
to meet a surge in demand irrespective of the target of current account balances, around JPY 10 to 
15 trillion. Just before the year-end, the Bank provided a maximum JPY 27 trillion, and, following this 
year-end requirement, the current account balance has been running around JPY 15 trillion. 
Graph 1 
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Note: Each month indicates a reserve maintenance period (from the 16th of one month to the 15th of the following month). 
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly. 
Meanwhile, in order to smoothly provide liquidity, the Bank increased its outright purchases of long-
term government bonds from JPY 400 billion to JPY 600 billion per month in August 2001, and 
thereafter to JPY 800 billion in December, and further to JPY 1 trillion in February 2002.
3 
After adopting quantitative easing, the growth rate of the monetary base started to markedly rise from 
the second half of 2001, reaching some 30% year on year in March-April 2002, the highest rise since 
the first oil shock in the 1970s (Graph 2). This has reflected the Bank’s ample provision of reserves  
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Note: CPI, GDP deflator and real GDP are adjusted to exclude the effects of the consumption tax hike in April 1997. 
Sources: Bank of Japan, Financial and economic statistics monthly, Principal figures of financial institutions; Ministry of Public 
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Consumer price index; Cabinet Office, National accounts. 
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Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and economic statistics monthly. 
and the increase in demand for cash caused by the decline in the opportunity cost of holding money. 
As a result, the ratio of the monetary base to nominal GDP has increased to 17%, the highest figure 
since the Second World War period. 
While the monetary base has posted double digit percentage growth year on year, what has been the 
reaction of financial markets since quantitative easing was adopted?
4 
First of all, amid the unprecedented abundant supply of liquidity, not surprisingly the uncollateralised 
overnight call rate was further lowered to 0.001 or 0.002%, literally almost zero (Graph 3). Another 
element of the new policy regime is a commitment to continue it until underlying CPI inflation turns 
positive. Currently in Japan, given economic weakness and persistent downward pressure on prices, 
most market participants do not see CPI inflation turning positive any time soon. Reflecting such an 
expectation, the decisive easing stance of the Bank of Japan exerted some downward effect on 
medium-term forward interest rates (Graph 4). 
Second, as the partial removal of blanket deposit insurance (for time and savings deposits, etc) 
approached, shifts from time and savings deposits to liquid deposits, and deposit shifts among 
financial institutions were widely seen until the end of fiscal 2001 (Graph 5). However, the substantial 
provision of reserves by the Bank succeeded in dispelling the liquidity concerns of financial institutions 
at the end of the fiscal year. Graph 6 shows the premium on the implied forward euroyen rate stepping 
over the end of the fiscal year, providing evidence of this situation. 
Third, a current account balance increase does not seem to have a strong effect on the corporate 
financing environment in capital markets such as the corporate bond and commercial paper (CP)   
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Graph 5 
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Source: Bank of Japan, Economic and financial data on CD-ROM. 
Graph 6 
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Note: Premium here is the rate increase in funding liquidity when the maturity steps over the end of the fiscal year. 
Premium = (implied forward rates from March to April) – (one month implied forward rates whose contracts expire within the 
same fiscal year : average of those from February to March and those from April to May). 
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Graph 7 
Yield spreads of corporate and public bonds 
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Note: Yields on bonds with five-year maturity. The indicated ratings are Moody’s. 
Source: Japan Securities Dealers Association, Over-the-counter standard bond quotations, Reference price (yields) table for 
OTC bond transactions. 
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Note: Yields on FB until March 1999 are replaced with yields on TB. 
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markets. Facing the weakening role of banks as financial intermediaries, enhancing the function of 
capital markets could be an important route for monetary easing. In this regard, the corporate 
financing environment has partly improved. The differential (credit spread) between interest rates on 
corporate bonds and CP and yields on risk-free government bonds declined marginally after March 
2001. It should be noted, however, that firms which reap the benefits of monetary easing effects are 
limited to those with high credit ratings. The effects have not fully permeated through to firms with low 
credit ratings and those unable to access capital markets. Credit spreads on low-grade corporate 
bonds have been rising since October 2001, because investors have become more conscious of credit 
risk. 
Fourth, the prices of other financial assets do not seem to be responding to quantitative easing. From 
March 2001, equity prices temporarily rose until around May because of the anticipated favourable 
impact of structural reform, but declined thereafter due to a deterioration in the economic outlook 
(Graph 8). After a short recovery from March 2002, equity prices gradually declined again, mainly 
reflecting the plunge in US equity prices. While equity price fluctuations reflect various factors, the 
most important factor seems to be prospects for economic fundamentals, not an increase in the 
monetary base. As for foreign exchange rates, the yen rate against the dollar mostly moved in the 
lower 120s but temporarily rose to 116 in September 2001 (Graph 9). The yen depreciated rapidly 
from November 2001 until February 2002. This seems to be attributable not to monetary easing but 
rather to a change in the economic outlook, as typically reflected in Japan’s equity prices; while 
expectations for recovery of the US economy strengthened, uncertainty over prospects for Japan’s 
economy intensified, including financial system stability. Thereafter, reflecting the plunge in US equity 
prices, the yen appreciated again to the 115 level in July 2002, and has recently seen little change 
around 120. So far, it is not clear whether the exchange rate and monetary base appear to move in a 
same way. 
Graph 8 
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Sources: Tokyo Stock Exchange, Monthly statistics report; Bank of Japan, Financial and economic statistics 
monthly. 
Finally, as for credit and broad money indicators, bank lending has kept decreasing, while the growth 
rate of M2+CDs has been stable at around 3% (Graph 2). The decline in bank lending and moderate 
growth in deposits should result in an increase in some other investments. So far, banks have 
increased investment in government bonds and Bank of Japan current accounts, both of which are 
free of credit risks. 
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In sum, at first sight monetary and financial indicators provide no clear evidence that quantitative 
easing has produced discernible effects with some exceptions at zero short-term interest rates. 
However, in order to judge carefully the full effects of quantitative easing, we need to evaluate them 
quantitatively by conducting empirical analyses based on economic theory. 
Graph 9 




































Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and economic statistics monthly. 
3. Monetary  policy  transmission at zero interest rates 
3.1  Monetary base channel 
The interest rate channel is the primary mechanism in conventional Keynesian macroeconomic 
models, which works through the change in the short-term interest rate. If this were the only channel, 
the economy would be under a liquidity trap when the short-term interest rate is zero.
5 However, 
monetarists criticise such a Keynesian view saying that conventional macroeconomic models 
significantly oversimplify the structure of the economy. In the traditional monetarist account, for a full 
liquidity trap to be effective, the composite asset - money plus bills - must be a perfect substitute for all 
other assets (Meltzer (1999a)). In practice, however, money is an imperfect substitute for a wide range 
of financial and real assets, including long-term bonds, corporate bonds, equities, foreign financial 
assets, physical capital, and durable goods.
6 A change in monetary policy induces a rebalancing of 
portfolios in general, affecting nominal demand both through wealth and substitution effects on real 
assets, and through adjustments in a wide range of financial yields relevant to expenditure decisions. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, even at zero interest rates the change in the monetary base is expected 
to cause this rebalancing effect through the following channels. 
                                                       
5  A “liquidity trap” was suggested by Keynes in the General Theory and revived recently by Krugman (1998, 1999). 
6  Some representative quotes of monetarists’ views: 
  Meltzer (1999b): “Monetary policy works by changing relative prices. There are many, many such prices. Some economists 
erroneously believe […] monetary policy works only by changing a single short-term interest rate.” 
  Friedman and Schwartz (1982, pp 57-8): “Keynesians regard a change in the quantity of money as affecting in the first 
instance ‘the’ interest rate, interpreted as a market rate on a fairly narrow class of financial liabilities […]. We insist that a far 
wider range of marketable assets and interest rates must be taken into account […]. [We] interpret the transmission 
mechanism in terms of relative price adjustment over a broad area rather than in terms of narrowly defined interest rates.” 
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The first channel is a relative asset supply effect. An open market operation by a central bank causes 
an opposite change in the stocks of the monetary base and securities held by banks, firms or 
households. Since the monetary base is not a perfect substitute for various other assets, changes in 
the outstanding balance of the monetary base due to monetary policy may lead to changes in the 
relative prices of assets. This relative asset supply effect can be realised by changes in the risk 
premium of asset prices. For example, Meltzer (2001) and McCallum (2000) argue that monetary 
authorities can use the monetary base to engineer exchange rate depreciation even when short-term 
nominal interest rates are zero. Implicitly, they view the risk premium in the uncovered interest parity 
relationship as subject to monetary policy manipulation in the short run.
7 
The risk premium can also be reduced by the second channel, which would work through the 
reduction of transaction costs by providing ample money.
8 The frictions which money helps to 
overcome in financial markets are related to its role in providing liquidity services. When economic 
agents anticipate a liquidity shortage regarding their future revenues, they will boost demand for liquid 
assets to avoid borrowing due to cash flow constraints. Such asset demand in preparation for a 
liquidity shortage leads to the higher evaluation of liquid assets. That is, liquidity demand might 
substantially raise the rates of illiquid assets relative to those of liquid assets due to a liquidity 
premium.
9 In such circumstances, the increase in money will reduce the probability of liquidity 
shortage, and consequently affect the liquidity premium and relative asset returns. The relief from 
concern over the liquidity of financial institutions, mentioned above under the second point of the 
reaction of financial markets (p 6), can be understood as such an example (Graph 6). From a different 
perspective, it might be expected that investors take risks more because of a decrease in the liquidity 
risk premium. Financial institutions might be candidates for such investors, and if they changed their 
attitude to lending, it would have a positive impact on aggregate demand. In this way, recognising the 
role of money in reducing financial frictions may provide a more significant role for money in the 
transmission mechanism. 
The expectation effect is another channel. A central bank can lower longer-term interest rates even when 
short-term rates are zero. Because longer-term rates are formed as averages of expected short-term 
rates plus some risk premium over their maturity, committing to maintaining the zero interest rate policy 
longer will lower expected future short-term interest rates. As the strength of this channel relies on the 
expectation of firms and households with respect to future monetary operations of the central bank, 
current changes in market operation, realised as an increase in the monetary base, may be expected to 
enhance the credibility of the central bank.
10 If this contributed to diminishing uncertainty over future 
short-term interest rates, the term premium would be reduced and hence longer-term rates would be 
lowered further. The above-mentioned decline in medium-term forward rates in Japan can be regarded 
as a typical example (Graph 4). It should be noted, however, that this expectation effect can also be 
classified as part of interest rate channels with longer-term maturities. 
As a variety of logic argues a variety of channels, it is difficult to crystallise all into a simple channel. 
Hereafter, this paper tentatively calls them the “monetary base channel”. As mentioned above, the 
monetary base channel depends on various changes in yields (or relative prices), rather than money 
per se.
11 Meltzer (1995, 1999a) argues that a measure of monetary conditions based on real money 
                                                       
7  However, empirical studies seem to have concluded in general that changes in the relative supply of dollar and foreign 
currency bonds have little or no lasting impact on exchange rates. In addition, although many useful studies have attempted 
to measure the degree of substitutability between dollar and foreign currency bonds, there are still no generally accepted 
estimates of these crucial parameters. These findings suggest that portfolio rebalancing effects on the exchange rate are 
probably negligible for small to medium-sized changes in the relative quantities of dollar and foreign currency bonds. Of 
course, they do not preclude the possibility that the Bank of Japan could cause a depreciation of the yen even at the zero 
bound. However, very large purchases of foreign currency bonds would be required to achieve a significant result. 
8  See, for example, King (1999, 2002). 
9  Saito and Shiratsuka (2001) point out that Japan’s financial institutions faced severe liquidity constraints during the financial 
crises that occurred in 1997 and 1998, and that the serious liquidity constraint prevailing in the banking sector resulted in 
depressed loan activities, limited arbitraging, and poor dealing among financial markets. 
10  See, for example, Meyer (2001). 
11  There is another view that focuses on money per se: the real balance effect (Pigou (1943)). However, the monetary base, 
namely “outside” money, accounts for only a very small fraction of financial wealth in developed countries. So the 
quantitative impact of the real balance effect is inevitably small. BIS Papers No 19  287
 
stock can be regarded as a better summary of the various changes in yields than a measure based on 
a specific real interest rate. One reason he offers for this is that money demand might, like aggregate 
demand, be a function of many interest rates, as in Friedman (1956). 
3.2  Review of the literature on empirical analyses 
When the monetary base channel works and the real money stock serves as a better summary of the 
various changes in yields relevant for economic activities, the monetary base enters the aggregate 
demand equation for a given short-term interest rate. That is, money could play a role in structural 
equations for aggregate demand, or in VARs, as a proxy for channels which are not summarised by 
the real interest rate on short-term securities. 
Koenig (1990) and Meltzer (1999a) show that real money growth is a significant determinant of 
consumption growth in the United States, controlling for the short-term real interest rate. Nelson (2000) 
also shows that the same property of base money holds for total output (relative to trend or potential) 
in both the United States and the United Kingdom. However, do these analyses indicate that the 
monetary base channel works at zero interest rates? While econometric models that are estimated 
using data from normal periods when the economy operates safely away from the zero bound can 
provide useful estimates of monetary transmission through the interest rate channel, they are unlikely 
to capture the effects of the monetary base channel that may remain operative when nominal interest 
rates are constrained at zero with considerable precision. Taking this point into account, we cannot 
necessarily regard the empirical analyses of Koenig (1990), Meltzer (1999a) and Nelson (2000) as 
evidence of the existence of the monetary base channel at zero interest rates, since their analyses do 
not include any samples from the zero interest rate period. 
As for Japan’s case, Baig (2002), using the VAR based on the data from 1980 to 2001, shows that 
expansion of the monetary base has positive effects on both price and output even with the interest 
rate included in the VAR as a separate variable. Then, Baig (2002) argues that Japan’s data support 
the existence of the monetary base channel even at zero interest rates. However, we have to examine 
whether his analysis really indicates the effectiveness of the monetary base channel at zero interest 
rates in Japan. Although Baig (2002) uses Japan’s data including the sample period of zero interest 
rates, his analysis is based on a VAR model which does not allow for time-varying parameters. In 
other words, his empirical results do not reflect the effect of the monetary base channel at zero interest 
rates, but the average effect of that channel during the whole sample period. This is a problem which 
arises from using a long sample which includes different policy regimes. Therefore, we cannot 
necessarily recognise that the analysis of Baig (2002) suggests the effectiveness of the monetary 
base channel at zero interest rates in Japan. 
Indeed, the results of Baig (2002) do not seem to be consistent with Japan’s recent economic 
performance. Although the growth rate of the monetary base has remained very high for several years, 
deflation persists in the economy, albeit at low rates (Graph 2). If his results were right, deflation would 
have stopped. Needless to say, money affects the economy with long and variable lags. We may have 
to wait just a bit longer. However, the usual range for the lag in the effects of monetary policy on the 
economy lies somewhere between half a year and approximately two years. Consequently, we seem 
to be witnessing something very unusual in the relationship between money and the economy. 
4. Empirical  analyses  based on a time-varying VAR 
In the previous section, we pointed out the problem regarding the empirical method of investigating the 
effect of the monetary base channel at zero interest rates. We should not extract the average effect of 
the monetary base channel during a long sample period, but that reflecting the sample period of zero 
interest rates only. A Bayesian VAR, a VAR with time-varying coefficients, is one way to solve this 
problem.
12 Using a time-varying VAR, we allow for possible changes in the interest rate elasticity of 
money demand and changes in the transmission mechanism at (near) zero interest rates. Since the 
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Bank of Japan has faced the zero interest rate bound, its policy reaction function has clearly changed. 
The regime change in monetary policy, from interest rate targeting to quantitative easing, will bring 
shifts in the responsiveness of economic activity to the increase in the monetary base. A time-varying 
VAR can capture these changes in economic structure and leads to impulse response functions that 
vary over time. 
4.1 VAR 
Before estimating a time-varying VAR, we begin by estimating a VAR as a benchmark, using Japan’s 
quarterly data over the sample period 1980:Q1-2002:Q1. The sample period is chosen to be the same 
as that in Baig (2002). The specific VAR that we consider contains four variables: inflation rate, output 
gap, monetary base (growth rate) and overnight call rate.
13, 14 Clearly, this VAR provides a very simple 
or simplistic description of the economy, but it contains at least the minimum set of variables that are 
crucial for any discussion of monetary policy.
15 We include four lags in the VAR according to AIC. The 
VAR is identified by using the Cholesky decomposition, with the order being inflation, output gap, 
interest rate and monetary base. The choice of ordering is made, according to Baig (2002), on the 
basis of the speed with which the variables respond to shocks, ie inflation is assumed to respond last, 
and the monetary base to be the most responsive. 
Graph 10 displays impulse response functions based on the estimated VAR. The basic results are the 
same as those of Baig. That is, both inflation and the output gap respond positively to innovations in 
the monetary base. Although these responses are not statistically significant, using a longer sample 
period, 1971:Q2-2002:Q1, results in a significant response (Graph 11).
16 As noted earlier, however, 
this result does not reflect the effect of the monetary base channel at zero interest rates, but the 
average effect of the channel during the whole sample period. It can be guessed that the experiences 
of the 1970s contributed to this result. Therefore, it is not necessarily appropriate to regard the results 
based on the VAR as evidence of the existence of the monetary base channel at zero interest rates. 
4.2 Time-varying  VAR 
Now, we estimate a time-varying VAR to properly analyse the effects of the monetary base channel at 
zero interest rates. Write the jth equation in a VAR as: 
j t j t t j t u X x , , 1 , + β ′ = −   (1) 
where xt,j is a jth endogenous variable, Xt–1 is a vector of lagged variables, and ut,j is an error term. 
βt,j is a vector of time-dependent parameters and is assumed to follow a random walk process. βt,j is 
updated according to a Kalman filter algorithm, based on a prior distribution on the initial value of a 
parameter vector β0,j.
17 Since βt,j is time-dependent, the impulse response functions vary over time. 
We focus on the impulse response functions at 1985:Q2 and those at 2002:Q1. The former functions 
are based on the parameter β1985:Q2, while the latter are based on the parameter β2002:Q1. These 
parameters are estimated by a Kalman filter over sample periods 1971:Q2-1985:Q2 and 1985:Q3-
2002:Q1, respectively. The parameter β1985:Q2 reflects the propagation mechanism of the period just  
 
                                                       
13  See the data appendix for a detailed description of the data. 
14  To check the robustness of our results, we have re-estimated the VAR by replacing output gap with output growth. While we 
report only the results obtained from the VAR with output gap, the VAR with output growth yields very similar results. 
15  To limit the extent of a “price puzzle” (see Sims (1992), Chari et al (1995) and Bernanke and Mihov (1998)), we re-estimate 
the VAR including commodity price inflation (or the wholesale price index), but the main results do not change. 
16  The original available data set runs from 1970:Q1 to 2002:Q1. Because of data transformation (first differences and lags), 
the analysis is performed on the 1971:Q2-2002:Q1 period. 
17  We set the hyperparameters of prior distribution at the values which Doan et al (1984) recommend for a typical economic 
time series. To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the time-varying VAR based on the optimised 
hyperparameters. While we report only the results obtained from the time-varying VAR with the hyperparameters which 

























Impulse response functions based on VAR (sample period: 1980:Q1-2002:Q1) 
Y: output gap            ON: uncollateralised overnight call rate (level)            P: inflation rate             MB: monetary base (growth rate) 
    
    








Note: The graph shows a 16-quarter response of variables to a one standard deviation innovation. The dashed lines represent ± 2 standard deviation bands. 
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Impulse response functions based on VAR (sample period: 1971:Q2-2002:Q1) 
Y: output gap            ON: uncollateralised overnight call rate (level)            P: inflation rate            MB: monetary base (growth rate) 
    
    


















Note: The graph shows a 16-quarter response of variables to a one standard deviation innovation. The dashed lines represent ± 2 standard deviation bands. 
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before the Plaza Accord, while β2002:Q1 reflects that after the adoption of quantitative easing. The 
reason why we compare the impulse response functions at 1985:Q2 with those at 2002:Q1 is that 
1985:Q2 is near the midpoint of the whole sample period 1971:Q2-2002:Q1. In order to examine 
whether the propagation mechanism differs between 1985:Q2 and 2002:Q1, we calculate the impulse 
responses to the common innovations whose covariance matrix is estimated over the whole sample 
1971:Q2-2002:Q1.
18 That is, since the covariance matrix of innovations is kept constant, the difference 
of the impulse response functions provides a measure of a change in the propagation mechanism in 
the face of unchanged disturbances. 
The result, which is shown in Graph 12, is clearly different from that of the VAR. This graph indicates 
that the increase in the monetary base has a positive effect on inflation at 1985:Q2, but not at 
2002:Q1. This finding implies that, beyond the interest rate channel, the monetary transmission 
process took place through the monetary base channel in the 1980s, but such transmission does not 
work now at zero interest rates. This seems to reflect the recent observation that the high growth rate 
of the monetary base does not lead to an indication of inflation (Graph 2). 
4.3  Implicit assumption of the monetary base channel 
Why does the underlying mechanism of the monetary base channel not work well as theoretically 
assumed? Here, it should be noted that the monetary base channel at zero interest rates is based on 
the implicit assumption that money demand is satiated at a finite level. That is, when interest rates are 
zero, households and firms become satiated with money balances, and any increase in the monetary 
base beyond that level leads to changes in their portfolios with consequent changes in relative yields 
on different financial and real assets, and direct and indirect effects on spending.
19 In contrast with 
such a view, there is another view. When interest rates are zero, households and firms have an 
infinitely elastic demand for money balances. An increase in the monetary base is absorbed passively 
in higher balances, and there are no implications for broader measures of money or demand and 
output. Monetary policy is impotent; there is a liquidity trap. 
Which view is consistent with the result of our analysis? As background to the result of the time-
varying VAR, we can set two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis I: As the interest rate tends to zero, demand for money balances tends to infinity. 
Therefore, monetary policy has no effect on economic activity at zero interest rates, 
because any additional money created is simply absorbed passively in money holdings. 
Hypothesis II: Money demand exhibits satiation such that the demand is finite at zero interest rates. 
Therefore, the monetary base channel works even at zero interest rates, but its effect is 
very small or negligible. 
In order to test which hypothesis is accepted, we must estimate the money demand function and 
examine whether there is a satiation level of money demand at zero interest rates.
20 The next section 
deals with this issue. 
                                                       
18  The shock is calculated as follows. We first calculate the residuals from the coefficients in each period, then the covariance 
matrix and make the orthogonal shock using the Cholesky decomposition. The ordering is chosen to be the same as that of 
the VAR: inflation, output gap, interest rate and monetary base. 
  The lag length is also chosen to be the same as that of the VAR, that is, four lags are included in the time-varying VAR. 
19  We must note that if there are only two financial assets, money and bonds, in the economy, the existence of a finite satiation 
level of real balances does not mean the existence of a monetary base channel at zero interest rates. Money demand is 
infinitely elastic at a satiation level in the sense that no further interest rate declines are needed to make people willing to 
hold larger real balances, even if the elasticity of money demand is bounded at all interest rates greater than zero. For an 
example of a simple model in which the monetary base channel is ineffective at a zero interest rate, and in which there is 
satiation in real balances at a finite level, see the discussion of “real balance effects” in Woodford (2002). 
20  Baig (2002) uses the monetary base (expressed as a ratio of potential output) and the level of interest rate in the VAR with a 
fixed parameter, which implicitly assumes that there is a satiation level of money demand at zero interest rates. Instead of 
the level of interest rates, if a logarithmic specification for interest rates is used as a variable of the VAR, it implicitly 
assumes that money demand tends to infinity as the interest rate tends to zero, that is, there is not a satiation level of 
money demand at zero interest rates. However, a constraint about whether there is a satiation level of money demand at 
























Impulse response functions based on time-varying VAR 
———2002:Q1 ----1985:Q2 
Y: output gap            ON: uncollateralised overnight call rate (level)            P: inflation rate            MB: monetary base (growth rate) 
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Note: The solid line shows a 16-quarter response of variables at 2002:Q1. The dashed line shows a 16-quarter response of variables at 1985:Q2. 
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5.  Satiation level of money demand 
5.1  General money demand function 
As in Friedman (1956), the demand for real balances depends not on a single interest rate but on 
many different interest rates, or, more generally, on the prices of assets relative to the prices of new 
production of the same assets. These relative prices settle down as the economy adjusts to an 
equilibrium at which all assets sell at replacement cost. In a full, general equilibrium, prices of bonds 
and real capital, of domestic and foreign assets, of new and used houses and automobiles, and many 
other relative prices, can be usefully summarised by a single interest rate. In transition, however, this 
does not hold true, and the demand for real balances differs from long-run desired real balances. 
Based on such logic, Meltzer (1999b) argues that the difference between actual and long-run desired 
money balances is a measure of the excess supply of money, the amount by which prices and other 
nominal variables must change to restore equilibrium in markets for assets and output.
21 
Here, we assume that long-run desired real balances can be modelled as follows: 
0    , 0    , 0
1






















where Mt, Pt, Yt and it are the monetary base, price level, real income and call rate, respectively. α, β, γ 
and δ are parameters. In equation (2), it is assumed that the relative prices of various assets can be 
usefully summarised by the call rate it in the long run. 
Equation (2) is consistent with a transactions-time approach and inventory-theoretic approach to 
money demand. The inventory-theoretic approach says that managing an inventory always requires 
time, and a larger real balance of money can reduce transaction time. A variation of the transactions-
time approach is that consumption requires shopping time, which can be decreased by holding a 
larger real balance. In order for the transactions-time approach to be consistent with satiation, it must 
be such that, at some positive real balance amounts, further increases in that ratio would not decrease 
transactions-time.
22 It should also be noted that equation (2) nests two familiar money demand 
functions as special cases: the log-log function and semi-log function. Consider the case when the call 
rate it is low enough for the approximation it /(1 + it) = it to be reasonable. Taking logs of equation (2) 
when δ = 0, we obtain the log-log function: 
γ + β − α = − ) ( log t t t t i y p m  (3) 
where all lower-case letters, excluding the interest rate it, refer to logarithms of the variables in upper-
case letters. The elasticity of money demand with respect to interest rates is a full elasticity, which 
shows the percentage change in money demand in response to a 1% change in interest rates. On the 
other hand, taking logs of equation (2) when δ > 0 and δ >> it, we obtain the semi-log function:
23 
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+ β − α =
γ + δ + β − α = −
Q
 (4) 
The response of money demand to interest rate changes is a semi-elasticity, which indicates the 
percentage change in cash holdings as a result of a 1 percentage point change in interest rates. 
                                                       
21  An alternative view is that the economy adjusts to reduce this gap by spending to reduce the real balance of money, when 
real balances are larger than desired, or to increase the gap by reducing spending when real balances are less than 
desired. This so-called “real balance effect” is generally considered small, since real balances are a small part of real wealth 
in developed countries. 
22  See Bakhshi et al (2002) and Wolman (1997). 
23 When  condition  δ >> it is not satisfied, this approximation does not hold true even if δ > 0.  
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In equation (2), the satiation level of money balances (expressed as quasi-Cambridge  k) at zero 
nominal interest rates is: 
γ β −
=
α δ = = e
0 i Y P
M
k   (5) 
which is finite if δ > 0.
24 In contrast, if δ = 0, this ratio k is infinite, which implies that there is no satiation 
level of money demand. Regarding log-log and semi-log money demand functions, the former does 
not have a satiation, whereas the latter does. The figure below illustrates the money demand curve 
and the location of the satiation level. 
 
Whether δ is zero or strictly positive gives a rather different policy implication. In the case of δ = 0, 
monetary policy would have no effect on real demand and output, because any additional money 
created would simply be absorbed passively in money holdings. In contrast, in the case of δ > 0, the 
monetary base channel works even at zero interest rates, because the creation of money beyond the 
satiation level would be translated into demand for other assets and, ultimately, via effects on relative 
yields, into nominal spending. 
5.2 Estimation  result 
Now, we estimate a money demand function and examine whether there is a satiation level of money 
demand. 
Before estimating equation (2) and testing the hypothesis that there is no satiation level (δ = 0) in 
equation (2), we first attempt to examine whether either of the functions, the log-log function (3) or the 
semi-log function (4), is appropriate for the long-run desired real balance. If equation (3) or (4) is 
appropriate for the long-run demand function, we will find a cointegrating relationship among real 
money (mt  – p t), income (yt) and interest rate (it or log(it)). Using Johansen’s (1988) maximum 
likelihood estimation procedure, we conduct a cointegrating test over the sample period 1978:Q1-
2002:Q1. The sample period is chosen to avoid the high-inflation period of the first-round increases in 
oil prices, since the behaviour of holding cash balances in the private sector may have changed after 
transition to a moderate- or low-inflation period. In addition, the policy stance of the Bank of Japan 
might also have changed after the first oil shock. Indeed, in 1978, the Bank began announcing 
quarterly forecasts of money supply. 
                                                       
24 Here,  we  call  M/(PY
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Table 1 shows the results of the maximum eigenvalue and trace test statistics of the Johansen test for 
log-log and semi-log functions. Both tests suggest that, for both specifications, there is no 
cointegrating vector among real money (mt – pt), income (yt) and interest rate (it or log(it)). This implies 
that neither the semi-log nor the log-log function is appropriate for the long-run money demand 




Johansen’s cointegration test 
(1) Series: mt – pt, yt, it 
Null hypothesis: 
rank = r  Maximum eigenvalue statistic  Trace statistic 












(2) Series: mt – pt, yt, log (it) 
Null hypothesis: 
rank = r  Maximum eigenvalue statistic  Trace statistic 












Notes:   1.  The sample period is 1978:Q1 to 2002:Q1.   2.  Numbers in parentheses are critical values at the 5% significance 
level.   3.  The lag length of the VECM is set to 4, obtained from the likelihood ratio test. 
 






































































   and     
                                                       
25 When  δ > 0, we cannot use Johansen’s (1988) maximum likelihood estimation procedure to estimate the parameter δ in 
equation (2), since taking logs of equation (2) does not lead to a linear system.  
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εt is the percentage deviation of actual money balances from long-run desired money balances. We 
can assume that the mean of εt is zero and that two composite variables, kt and iit, follow stationary 
processes. Regarding εt as an error term, we estimate equation (6) with instrumental variables using 
the generalised method of moments (GMM). The reason why we use GMM is that εt can be 
considered highly autocorrelated and that the regressors, kt and iit, in equation (6), are themselves 
endogenous. Due to difficulty in calculation convergence, the estimation of parameter α is carried out 
by a grid search method. The search is carried out over the range 0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1.5 at intervals of 0.001. 
Estimation results, shown in Table 2, are clearly consistent with the existence of a satiation level of 
money demand. Parameter δ is significantly positive, since the null hypothesis δ = 0 can be rejected at 
the 5% significance level (p-value = 0.011). This result of δ > 0 is consistent with the cointegration test, 
which suggests that log-log function (4) is inappropriate for the long-run money demand function. The 
result also implies that equation (2) can be approximated by semi-log function (3) when δ >> it. When 
condition δ >> it is not satisfied, however, equation (2) differs from semi-log function (3). Graph 13 
displays a plot of kt versus iit. The solid line in this graph shows fitted values when parameters are 
estimated without any constraint, and the dashed line shows fitted values when non-satiation is 
imposed (δ = 0). 
 
Table 2 
Estimation results of equation (6) 
Parameter 
restriction  α  β  γ  δ  se  J-test  LR(1) 






0.0874  5.520 
[0.479] 
– 








Notes:   1.  This table reports GMM estimates of the parameters of equation (6). The sample period is 1978:Q1 to 2002:Q1. 
Instruments used include four lags of kt, four lags of iit, and a constant term. A four-lag Newey-West estimate of the variance-
covariance matrix is used. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.   2.  Due to difficulty in calculation convergence, the 
estimation of the parameter α is carried out by a grid search method. The search is carried out over the range 0.5 ≤ α ≤ 1.5 at 
intervals  of  0.001.   3.  The  column  J-test corresponds to the Hansen test of the overidentifying restrictions. Numbers in 
brackets are p-values, for testing the null hypotheses.   4.  The column LR(1) corresponds to the likelihood ratio-type test of 
the parameter constraint δ = 0. The number in brackets is a p-value, for testing the null hypothesis δ = 0. 
 
In order to confirm that equation (2) is appropriate for the long-run money demand function, we also 
conduct a unit root test for the error term εt in equation (6). When equation (2) is appropriate for the 
long-run money demand function, we will find that εt naturally follows a stationary process. Graph 14 
shows the results of ADF test and Phillips-Perron test. Both tests suggest that the null hypothesis that 
εt follows a non-stationary process can be statistically rejected. 
Although we may need more data from the zero interest rate period to estimate the money demand 
function with much precision, we can tentatively conclude that equation (2) with strictly positive δ is 
appropriate for the long-run desired money function, and reject Hypothesis I in Section 4.3. There is a 
satiation level of money demand at zero interest rates, which leaves room for the monetary base 
channel to work even at zero interest rates. But, to what degree does the monetary base channel 
work? Taking the results of the time-varying VAR into account, Hypothesis II in Section 4.3 seems to 
be supported: the effect, if any, of the monetary base channel at zero interest rates is very small (or 
negligible). In order to support this view, in the next section we estimate the model that includes both 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply equations and examine whether the monetary base enters 
these equations significantly.  
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Graph 13 
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Graph 14 
Percentage deviation of actual money balances 














































































Unit root tests 
ADF test    Phillips-Perron test 
Lags Statistics  p-value   Lags  Statistics  p-value 
4  −2.906  0.004   4  −13.412  0.011 
Notes:   1.  The null hypothesis is that the εt follows a unit root process.   2.  The sample period is 1978:Q1 to 2002:Q1. 
 
6.  Effectiveness of the monetary base channel 
Our model is small-scale but a standard macroeconomic model which comprises four basic equations: 
aggregate demand function (IS curve), aggregate supply function, money demand function (LM curve) 
and monetary policy rule. The aggregate demand function relates total demand to either money or 
interest rates and to expected inflation. The aggregate supply function relates the inflation rate to 
either the output gap or real money gap and to inflation expectations. The money demand function 
relates real cash balances to total expenditure and the interest rate. The monetary policy rule relates 
the interest rate to the difference between inflation and the central bank’s inflation target. The model 
determines the values of output, inflation, the interest rate and money growth. Much recent research 
on monetary policy is based on variants of this four-equation system. 
Using the four-equation system, we first estimate the model, as a benchmark, where money plays no 
role in determining output and inflation. Such a model is often called a “passive money paradigm”.  
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Then, we estimate the model where money plays an explicit role in determining output and inflation. 
This model is often called an “active money paradigm”.
26 
6.1  Passive money paradigm: benchmark model 
Our benchmark model based on a passive money paradigm is described as follows: 
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Explanation of symbols in the above equations.
27 
yt, output;  ,
n
t y  potential output;  ,
n
t t y y −  output gap; 
n
t y ∆ , potential growth rate; pt, price level; ∆pt, 
inflation rate; mt, nominal money balance (monetary base); rmt, real money balance; ∆rmt, real money 
growth;  ,
n
t rm  long-run desired real money balance; εt, percentage deviation of actual money balances 
from long-run desired money balances; it, call rate;  *
t i , desired call rate prescribed by simple policy 
rule;  ,
n
t i  equilibrium nominal interest rate;  ,
n
t r  equilibrium real interest rate;  , *
t π  central bank’s inflation 
target;  ] [ 1 + ∆ − t t t p E i , real interest rate;  ,
AD
t η  demand shock;  ,
AS
t η  supply shock;  ,
LM
t η  monetary 
shock;  ,
MP
t η  interest rate shock; φ, σ, θ, λ, τ, ψ, ω, µ, all the parameters are expected to be positive 
(1 > φ ≥ 0, 1 ≥ τ ≥ 0, ω > 0, µ > 1). 
The aggregate demand function (7) and aggregate supply function (8) are conventional IS and Phillips 
curves.
28, 29 The money demand function (9) is a standard error correction model. Taking the zero 
                                                       
26  See Laidler (1999) and Engert and Selody (1998). 
27  See the data appendix for a detailed description of the data. 
28  In recent research on monetary policy, the IS curve and Phillips curve range from purely backward-looking specifications 
(eg in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999)) to forward-looking, theory-based optimising specifications. Here, we focus on the 
backward-looking model. 
29  Since we use the GDP deflator as inflation rate ∆pt, we do not need to add the exchange rate (or import prices) to the 
Phillips curve.  
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interest rate bound into account, we explicitly incorporate the non-negativity constraint on interest rates 
into the policy rule (10). Call rate it is equal to desired rate  *
t i  prescribed by the simple policy rule when 
*
t i  is above zero, while it is set at zero when  *
t i  is below zero.
30 This defines two linear relationships 
between it and  *
t i (if  *
t i > 0, it =  , *
t i  otherwise it = 0). We assume that the relationship between the actual 
call rate and desired rate is slightly smoother than suggested by the linear formulas. We assume that this 
is approximated by a hyperbola with the two lines as asymptotes. The parameter ω in equation (10) 
measures the extent to which the hyperbola is distant from the two lines. As clear from the IS curve 
(equation (7)), we here assume that monetary policy operates with a one-period lag. 
An important feature of the above model based on a passive money paradigm is that the real money 
stock (or its growth rate) appears in neither the IS nor the Phillips curve. This model therefore limits 
the influence of monetary policy on output and inflation to its effect on the real interest rate.
31 Money 
itself does not play any active role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
We estimate the above model using GMM.
32 Since single-equation and system estimates sometimes 
differ a great deal, we conduct system estimation in order to appropriately evaluate the relationships 
between economic variables.
33 Fixing the starting point of regressions at 1978:Q1, we conduct rolling 
regressions and examine the stability of estimated parameters. We use the dummy variables, aiming 
to control for a Y2K-related temporary surge in liquidity demand during the final quarter of 1999. 
Graph 15 shows estimates of parameters from rolling regressions with the horizontal axis showing the 
end of the sample period for each regression. All the estimated parameters have the expected sign 
(positive) and are significant. In addition, all parameters, excluding τ and ψ in the money demand 
function, are stable. Around the final quarter of 2000, the persistence of money growth (τ) begins to 
increase and the adjustment speed of the money stock (ψ) begins to fall. The background of this result 
is not clear, but is partly due to the very low opportunity cost of holding money, which will reduce 
private agents’ incentives to adjust cash balances quickly. 
It should also be noted that the parameter µ in equation (10) statistically exceeds 1, that is, the 
so-called “Taylor principle” is satisfied.
34, 35 One piece of conventional wisdom to emerge from the 
recent study on monetary policy rules is that policy is stabilising when the central bank raises the 
nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with the inflation rate. Put differently, under a stabilising 
policy, in response to a rise in the inflation rate, nominal interest rates should rise sufficiently to 
increase real interest rates. This implies that monetary policy based on the interest rate channel 
stabilises the economy unless the non-negativity constraint on interest rates is binding. 
                                                       
30  Consider the case when the central bank’s loss function is the unconditional expectation of the discounted sum of quadratic 
deviations of output from potential and quadratic deviations of inflation from a target of zero. Given this assumption and the 
model comprising equations (7) to (9), the linear-quadratic nature of the problem implies that a simple representation of the 
optimal policy takes the following form similar to the Taylor rule, unless the non-negativity constraint on interest rates is 
binding: 
  ) ( ) * ( ) * ( *
1 1 2 1
n
t t t t t t
n
t t y y p p i i − ν + π − ∆ µ + π − ∆ µ + = − −  
  See Gerdesmeier et al (2002) for details. Here, we assume µ1 = µ2, which leads to equation (10). 
31  Our benchmark model includes only short-term interest rates, not other yields of financial assets, such as exchange rates 
and equity prices. However, this does not imply that our model excludes the effects of monetary policy through a change in 
those yields. Our benchmark model adequately summarises this transmission mechanism with a single policy rate under 
two assumptions: first, monetary policy operates by changing some short-term interest rate; second, all other interest rates 
and asset prices are linked, directly or indirectly, to the policy rate through stable and predictable arbitrage relationships. 
However, when this is not the case, that is, when such a transmission cannot be summarised by a single policy rate due to 
the non-negativity constraint on interest rates, the monetary base may play a role in structural equations for aggregate 
demand or aggregate supply as a proxy for changes in the various yields of financial assets. This issue is treated in the next 
section. 
32  The parameter of the long-run money demand function (α, β, γ, δ) is fixed at the value estimated over the full sample (see 
Table 2). We also set the parameter ω in equation (10) at 0.01 a priori. 
33  See, for example, Leeper and Zha (2001). 
34  The estimated parameters of policy rule (10), µ ≈ 1.2 and ν ≈ 0.2, are slightly smaller than those of the original Taylor rule 
(µ = 1.5, ν = 0.5), but they are roughly the same. 
35  See, for example, Taylor (1999) and Clarida et al (1999).  
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Graph 15 
Passive money paradigm 
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Notes:   1.  This graph shows estimates of parameters from rolling regressions with the horizontal axis showing the end of 
sample for each regression. The starting point of regression is fixed at 1978:Q1.   2.  Dotted lines show the interval estimates 
of  ±2  standard  errors.   3.  Effects  of  the  Y2K  problem  (2000:Q1) and the removal of blanket deposit insurance for time 
deposits, etc (2002:Q1) are adjusted by dummy variables. 
However, once shocks to aggregate demand and/or supply push the economy into a sufficiently deep 
recession, the zero bound in equation (10) renders the interest rate channel completely ineffective. 
Because of maintaining expectations of continuing deflation, a zero interest rate policy may not suffice 
for keeping the real interest rate below its equilibrium level. With a shock large enough to keep the 
short-term real interest rate above its equilibrium level, aggregate demand is suppressed further 
sending the economy into a deflationary spiral. This implies that the system comprising equations (7) 
to (10) is globally unstable. In the next section, we examine whether we can resolve this global 
instability, focusing on the monetary base channel that may continue to operate even when the 
interest rate channel is ineffective. 
6.2 Active  money  paradigm 
Modifying the benchmark model, we build a model based on an active money paradigm. There are two 
routes which allow the monetary base channel to work. The first is the possible presence of money 
terms in the aggregate demand function. The second is the possible presence of money terms in the 
aggregate supply function. If either route is secured, the central bank can still provide stimulus to the 
economy even at zero interest rates by increasing the monetary base. In the following, we investigate 
how effective these routes are.  
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Case 1  Effect of an increase in the monetary base on aggregate demand 
Following Meltzer (1999a) and Nelson (2000), we add the monetary base as a determinant of 












t t rm rm r p E i y y y y η + ∆ − ∆ ξ + − ∆ − σ − − φ = − − − − − − − − ) ( ] [ ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  (11) 
where a one-period lag of real monetary base growth (less long-run desired growth), 
, 1 1
n
t t rm rm − − ∆ − ∆ is added to the IS curve. 
Conducting rolling regressions using GMM, we estimate equations (8), (9), (10) and (11). Estimation 
results are shown in Graph 16. Overall, adding real monetary base growth to the IS curve does not 
 
Graph 16 
Active money paradigm (Case 1) 
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Notes:   1.  This graph shows estimates of parameters from rolling regressions with the horizontal axis showing the end of 
sample for each regression. The starting point of regression is fixed at 1978:Q1.   2.  Dotted lines show the interval estimates 
of  ±2  standard  errors.   3.  Effects  of  the  Y2K  problem  (2000:Q1) and the removal of blanket deposit insurance for time 
deposits, etc (2002:Q1) are adjusted by dummy variables. 
lead to a change in the estimated parameters. All parameters, excluding parameter ξ, remain 
unchanged, and they are almost the same as those estimated under the passive money paradigm. 
What we should point out here is that the sensitivity of the output gap to a change in the monetary 
base (ξ) is very unstable. It varies considerably depending on the data set (the end of sample). For 
example, parameter ξ is significantly positive in 1997 and around the final quarter of 2000, but not so  
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in 1999. Moreover, estimation with the full sample (1978:Q1-2002:Q1) results in a significant but 
wrong (negative) sign for parameter ξ. Even when parameter ξ is significantly positive, the size is 
rather small, 0.01 at most. This implies a long-run parameter of around 0.1 at most, which is below 
one seventh of that found for the United States and the United Kingdom by Nelson (2000).
36 
We now report several robustness checks. 
Graph 17 
Robustness check 
AD-AMP - equation (12)  Parameters ξk in equation (12) 
     
AS - equation (8)       
       
LM and MP - equations (9) and (10)     
       
Notes:   1.  This graph shows estimates of parameters from rolling regressions with the horizontal axis showing the end of 
sample for each regression. The starting point of regression is fixed at 1978:Q1.   2   Dotted lines show the interval estimates 
of ±2 standard errors.      3.    Effects of the Y2K problem (2000:Q1) and the removal of blanket deposit insurance for time 
deposits, etc (2002:Q1) are adjusted by dummy variables. 
                                                       
36  The long-run parameter on real monetary base growth is calculated as ξ/(1 – φ). Nelson (2000) finds that the long-run 
parameter on real monetary base growth ranges from 3.0 to 3.84 for the United States and the United Kingdom. Since he 
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Notes:   1.  The p-values are based on the likelihood ratio-type tests. The horizontal axis shows the end of 
sample for each test. The starting point of regression is fixed at 1978:Q1.   2.  The dotted line shows the 5% 
significance level. 
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First, to check the sensitivity of the results to the lag specification, we estimate the following IS curve 
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t t rm rm r p E i y y y y η ξ σ φ + ∆ − ∆ + − ∆ − − − = − ∑
=
− − − − − − − − −
4
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) ( ] [ ) (  (12) 
where four lags of real monetary base growth are added. Estimation results, shown in Graphs 17 and 18, 
suggest that all parameters, excluding ξi, remain unchanged and that the sum of estimated parameters 
ξi, Σξi, is roughly the same as parameter ξ in equation (11). The p-value of the null hypothesis of Σξi = 0 
indicates that the effectiveness of the monetary base channel is highly uncertain. Σξi is significantly 
positive in some periods, but not in others. Unlike the results of Graph 16, estimation with the full sample 
(1978:Q1-2002:Q1) results in an expected sign (positive) of Σξi, but it is not statistically significant. In 
addition, even the highest value of Σξi is around 0.02, which is still very small. 
Second, to check the robustness of our results, we have re-estimated the model by replacing real 
monetary base growth with the real money stock (less desired money demand), εt, in the IS curve.
37 








t t r p E i y y y y η + ε ξ + − ∆ − σ − − φ = − − − − − − − ) ( ] [ ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1  (13) 
Although we omit the results, this replacement does not change inferences about the effectiveness of 
the monetary base channel; namely, if any, it is highly uncertain and very small. 
Finally, we estimate the model by adding nominal monetary base growth (less long-run desired growth) 
to the policy rule. When the monetary base channel works, it is optimal for the central bank to respond to 
the change in the monetary base in order to stabilise the economy.
38 Leeper and Zha (2001) suggest the 
possibility that estimating the model with different policy rules may result in different estimated 
parameters of the structural equation. To examine this possibility, we replace equation (10) with the 
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However, neither does this replacement change our main results. (Estimation results are omitted.
39) 
Overall, these results suggest that the effectiveness of the monetary base channel is very uncertain, 
and we cannot find any certain route through which the central bank can provide stimulus to the 
economy at zero interest rates. 
Case 2  Effect of an increase in the monetary base on inflation 
Following Gerdesmeier et al (2002) and Gerlach and Svensson (2000), we replace the Phillips curve 
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37  See Orphanides and Wieland (2000) for this specification. 
38  See Gerdesmeier et al (2002). 
39  The estimation results are available on request. 
40 The  P* model was originally proposed in Hallman et al (1991).  
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The P* model assigns an active role to monetary developments in inflation dynamics. Although the 
microeconomic foundations of the P* model are not well developed, the model can be implicitly 
related to the view that monetary disequilibria result in greater spending and thus more demand 
pressures (eg Laidler (1999)).
41 Specifically, inflationary pressure is related to the real money gap 
 
Graph 19 
Active money paradigm (Case 2) 
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Notes:   1.  This graph shows estimates of parameters from rolling regressions with the horizontal axis showing the end of 
sample for each regression. The starting point of regression is fixed at 1978:Q1.   2.  Dotted lines show the interval estimates 
of  ±2 standard errors.      3.    Effects of the Y2K problem (2000:Q1) and the removal of blanket deposit insurance for time 
deposits, etc (2002:Q1) are adjusted by dummy variables. 
                                                       
41  More generally, the P* model can be seen as a reduced form representing a monetary transmission with a long pedigree, 
namely one that places imperfections in the financial system, monetary expansions and the resulting credit booms and 
busts at the heart of explanations of macroeconomic developments (eg Friedman and Schwartz (1982), Kindleberger (1987) 
and Minsky (1982)).  
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) * ( t t p p − , which measures the excess of real money over that consistent with monetary equilibrium. 
Prices revert to the level implied by monetary equilibrium through an error correction process.
42 
Conducting rolling regressions using GMM, we estimate equations (7), (9), (10) and (15). Estimation 
results are shown in Graph 19. The sensitivity of the inflation rate to the real money gap (λ) is 
significantly positive when it is estimated over the subsample excluding the recent five years 
(1978:Q1-1997:Q1). However, it has continued to decline for the past five years. Parameter λ 
estimated over the full sample (1978:Q1-2002:Q1) is very close to zero. In addition, the sensitivity of 
the inflation rate to the change in the price level implied by monetary equilibrium, 1 – θ, has also 
continued to decline. Since the estimated parameter reflects the average effectiveness of the   
 
Graph 20 
Active money paradigm (Case 3) 
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Notes:   1.  This graph shows estimates of parameters from rolling regressions with the horizontal axis showing the end of 
sample for each regression. The starting point of regression is fixed at 1978:Q1.   2.  Dotted lines show the interval estimates 
of  ±2  standard  errors.   3.  Effects  of  the  Y2K  problem  (2000:Q1) and the removal of blanket deposit insurance for time 
deposits, etc (2002:Q1) are adjusted by dummy variables. 
                                                       
42  Gerlach and Svensson (2000), Kimura (2001) and Orphanides and Porter (2000) apply the P* model to Europe, Japan and 
the United States, respectively. They all find that the real money gap is a significant determinant of inflation.  
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monetary base channel during the long sample period, such a drastic decline in parameters λ and 
1 − θ may imply that the monetary base channel has hardly worked in the recent period, that is, at zero 
interest rates. Such an interpretation is consistent with the result of the time-varying VAR in 
Section 4.2. 
Case 3  Effect of an increase in the monetary base on aggregate demand and inflation 
Finally, consider the case combining Case 1 and Case 2. We assume that the monetary base is a 
determinant of both aggregate demand and aggregate supply by using equations (11) and (15). 
Estimation results are shown in Graph 20. The sensitivity of the output gap to the change in the 
monetary base (ξ) is not statistically significant, or does not have the expected sign. Like the results of 
Case 2, parameters λ and 1 – θ in the P* model have continued to decline for the past five years. 
In sum, the results of this section suggest that the effectiveness, if any, of the monetary base channel 
is highly uncertain and very small. We cannot find any certain route through which the central bank 
can provide stimulus to the economy at zero interest rates. 
7. Discussion 
The results reported in the last two sections indicate that there is a satiation level of money demand 
and thus there may remain room for the monetary base channel to work even at zero interest rates, 
but that its effect, if any, is very uncertain and small. Why is it so uncertain and small? We first need to 
point out that since long-term interest rates were already at a very low level when the Bank of Japan 
adopted quantitative easing, room for further reducing them through monetary policy was limited, 
which is a factor weakening the expectation channel. In addition, Japan’s economy has faced various 
kinds of uncertainties about the future course, including the NPL problem and structural adjustment of 
the economy as well as the short-run global economic outlook. These uncertainties have increased the 
risk premium of a wide range of financial and real assets, which seems to far exceed the quantitative 
magnitude of the effect of an increase in the monetary base. Let us briefly discuss two more 
hypotheses of the uncertain and small effects of the monetary base channel, focusing on a structural 
aspect of Japan’s financial market in recent years. 
The first is that precautionary demand for money reflecting financial system instability is highly volatile, 
which weakens the effect of the monetary base channel and makes its effect uncertain. Precautionary 
demand for liquidity increased substantially at the end of 1999 in preparation for the Y2K problem and 
in early 2001 during the process of introducing real-time gross settlement (RTGS). It also increased in 
September 2001 because of the terrorist attacks in the United States, the bankruptcy of a large 
retailer, and a fall in equity prices raising concerns over liquidity. Given a supply of the monetary base, 
the increase in precautionary demand for money reduces excess money which would otherwise be 
translated into demand for other assets and, ultimately, via effects on relative yields, into nominal 
spending. 
The second hypothesis is that concerns about capital positions at private banks prevent them from 
taking risks, which fails in raising the relative price of risky assets and weakens the effect of the 
monetary base channel. The quantitative easing measures since March 2001 have not apparently 
changed banks’ lending behaviour. Specifically, the declining trend in bank lending has mildly 
accelerated, while the growth in the money stock, deposits held by households and corporations, has 
changed little at an annual rate of around 3%. The decline in bank lending and moderate growth in 
deposits should result in an increase in some other investment. So far, banks have increased 
investment in government bonds and current accounts at the Bank of Japan, both of which are free of 
credit risks. Then, why has bank lending not increased? Financial institutions have faced the risk of 
their capital being impaired by external factors such as an accumulation of NPLs following a downturn 
in asset prices and the restructuring of industries and firms. Capital is the buffer against unexpected 
risks and losses. It is difficult for the management of financial institutions to take risks when they are 
concerned about their capital position. Therefore, the Bank’s efforts to expand liquidity, current 
account balances at the Bank or the monetary base, do not lead to an increase in broad money, that 
is, liquidity held by the corporate and household sectors, and consequently do not push up prices and 
the level of business activity.  
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In sum, money cannot play a role as the superior index of monetary policy effects, at least not when 
precautionary demand for money is highly volatile or banks cannot take risks due to concerns about 
their capital position. 
Still, a question may remain: even if the effects of the monetary base channel are very uncertain and 
small, why does the Bank not aggressively try the “unconventional” policy of purchasing some specific 
assets such as stocks and property in order to affect their prices? The problem is that, to have any 
promise of significant results, such unconventional policy operations would probably need to be 
implemented on a very large scale. However, beyond the fact that it would have to be very large, next 
to nothing is known about the magnitude of monetarisation required to achieve a given result. Moving 
in this direction is understandably difficult, since the cost of such unconventional policies increases 
substantially when uncertainty about the effects of the monetary base channel is taken into account.
43 
8. Concluding  remarks 
The Bank of Japan adopted a new monetary easing framework in March 2001. It is still too early to 
draw definite conclusions on the effects of the framework and, in this regard, conclusions in this paper 
are tentative until more data become available. As mentioned at the outset, the current state of 
Japan’s economy is unprecedented in that it is confronted with both a zero interest rate boundary and 
sizeable NPLs, and thus we will continue to examine the tentative conclusions of this paper by cross-
checking them in the light of facts and theories. 
As to the most evident effects, we can point out that the abundant and flexible provision of liquidity 
under the quantitative easing framework successfully maintained extremely easy monetary conditions, 
thereby preserving financial market stability. Recall the difficulties we have experienced since the end 
of 2000, namely, a global economic retreat triggered by the bursting of the global IT bubble and the 
tragic events of 11 September. Additionally, Japan suffered from the adverse impact of structural 
adjustment and rising concerns over the financial system. It is thus significant that the Bank’s flexible 
and abundant provision of liquidity calmed down market participants’ concerns over liquidity financing. 
There is little doubt such accommodative monetary conditions played a key role in preventing a 
deflationary spiral. 
Apart from this role in mitigating negative impacts, what other positive effects has the increase in the 
monetary base had on the economy? While we can enumerate several routes of the monetary base 
channel which suggest that expansion of the monetary base can have some expansionary effect on 
the economy, our analyses suggest that the quantitative magnitude of any such effect is highly 
uncertain and very small. Of course, we still cannot deny the possibility that the positive effect will 
increase and lead to a change in the portfolios of economic agents and ultimately stimulate economic 
activity in the long run. Once structural reforms such as the disposal of NPLs and the adjustment of 
industry-wide structure progress to a satisfactory degree, the quantitative easing policy will support 
them by alleviating the negative shocks occurring in a transition period, and might have stronger 
effects on the economy.
44 Based on the analysis of the policy effects and the economic situation, one 
should discuss what macro- and microeconomic policy should be sought for Japan’s economy. 
                                                       
43  Another essential issue with respect to unconventional policy is the governance of a central bank in a democratic society. If 
a central bank purchases a variety of assets aggressively as a monetary policy, it is effectively stepping into the territory of 
fiscal policy. The reason is that the bank, by subsidising specific parties or by holding risky assets, has to incur a loss, which 
will be transferred to taxpayers in the end, and engages in micro policy regarding resource allocations. See Yamaguchi 
(2001) for details. 
44  On 11 October 2002, the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan approved basic guidelines on the purchase of stocks held by 
commercial banks. This approval was made in response to the Bank’s announcement of 18 September 2002 (“New initiative 
toward financial system stability”), in which the Bank stated that it would explore possible policy measures to enhance 
financial institutions’ efforts to reduce their shareholdings. The Bank does not regard the purchase of stocks as a liquidity 
provision measure in the form of monetary policy, and its decision is based on the understanding that market risk pertaining 
to the shareholdings of Japanese banks has become a significant destabilising factor for their management. On 11 October, 
the Bank also published a comprehensive review of the NPL problem entitled “Japan’s nonperforming loan problem”, which 
also responded to the “new initiative”. The purpose of these actions is to facilitate resolution of the NPL problem and to 
secure financial system stability.  
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Data appendix 
(1)  Monetary base (mt) 
Seasonally adjusted by X12-ARIMA. The change in the reserve requirement ratio is also adjusted. 
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and economics statistics monthly. 
(2) Output  (yt) 
Real GDP seasonally adjusted by X12-ARIMA.
45 Outliers are adjusted in 1989:Q1 and 1997:Q1. This 
adjustment is aimed at capturing the temporary surge in demand ahead of the consumption tax hike. 
Source: Cabinet Office, National accounts. 
(3) Potential  output  ) (
n
t y  
Estimated by using the Hodrick-Prescott filter on yt. 
(4)  Overnight call rate (it) 
Uncollateralised rate (monthly average) is used for the sample after 1985:Q1, while the collateralised 
rate (monthly average) is used for that before 1984:Q4. 
Source: Bank of Japan, Financial and economics statistics monthly. 
(5)  Price level (pt) and inflation rate (∆pt) 
GDP deflator seasonally adjusted by X12-ARIMA. Level shifts are adjusted in 1989:Q2 and 1997:Q2. 
This adjustment is aimed at capturing the upward shift due to the consumption tax hike. 
Source: Cabinet Office, National accounts. 
(6)  The Bank’s inflation target (π *
t ) 
We assume that the target range of the inflation rate is between 0.5 and 2.5% and that the target rate 
has a smooth underlying trend. Then, we estimate the following sigmoid function: 
0      ,  
)] ( exp[ 1
2
5 . 2 *     , * > ρ
− ρ +
− = π ζ + π = π
t T
t t t t  
where ζt is the error term. For very large ρ, πt* essentially collapses to a step function that equals 2.5% 
when t < T and equals 0.5% (=2.5 − 2) when t > T. In this case, the estimate of T offers the best 
estimated location of the structural break. We estimate this sigmoid function by non-linear least 
squares. The estimated midpoint of the transition (determined by T) is 1987:Q2. The estimated value 
of parameter ρ is 0.139. 
(7)  The inflation rate, interest rate, and growth rate of the monetary base are all measured in 
percentages at an annual rate. 
                                                       
45  The sample after 1980:Q1 is based on 93SNA, while that before 1979:Q4 is based on 68SNA.  
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